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ABSTRACT. Effortsto identify the determinants of environmental policy success at
the national level have largely been anecdotal and case study based. This article
seeks to identify empirically the factors that drive environmental performance as
measured by levels of urban particulates and sulfur dioxide and energy use per unit
of GDP. Although the data are imperfect and causal linkages cannot be deﬁnitively
established, the statistical analysis presented suggests that environmental results vary
not only with income levels as suggested by the environmental Kuznets Curve
literature but also with both the sophistication of a nation’s regulatory regime and,
perhaps more notably, its broader economic and social context. Thus, at every level
of development, countries face policy choices that determine environmental quality in
important ways. Strong environmental performance appears to be positively correlated
with competitiveness, putting into question the presumed trade-off between economic
progress and environmental gains. Although preliminary, these results provide evidence
that environmental decision making can be made more data driven and analytically
rigorous.
Concern for the environment exists in every country. But, despite
the emergence of signiﬁcant pollution control and natural resource
management programs in most nations, little rigorous analysis has been
done to identify the factors that determine whether environmental efforts
succeed. Research to date has put forward theories and explored case
studies, but systematic statistical investigations in the environmental arena
have been limited. Within the discipline of economics, considerable focus
has been given to the relationship between environmental outcomes and
national income (Shaﬁk and Bandyopadhyay, 1992; Grossman andKrueger,
1995; Harbaugh et al., 2000). This Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)
literature has broadened beyond the income–environment relationship to
examine a variety of additional impacts on environmental performance,
including corruption (Lopez andMitra, 2000), freedom (Barrett andGraddy,
2000), inequality (Torras and Boyce, 1998), openness to trade (Suri and
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Chapman, 1998; Antweiler et al., 1998), energy (Suri and Chapman, 1998),
and the spatial density of economic activity (Kaufmann et al., 1998).
In the environmental ﬁeld, a number of initiatives have been launched
to develop metrics or indicators of environmental performance.1 A few
efforts have been made to use regression analysis or other advanced
statistical techniques to explore the relationship between policy choices and
environmental performance (York et al., 2003; Dasgupta et al., 2001, 2002;
Panayotou, 1997). But none of these efforts has examined a large number
of countries (including both developed and developing countries) across a
broad spectrum of possible policy determinants.
The resulting knowledge gap is unfortunate. Without solid evidence
on how regulatory choices and a nation’s underlying economic and
legal system affect environmental performance, policies are often based
on crude analysis, heated rhetoric, and imprecise concepts such as
‘sustainable development’. The lack of systematic data and analysis fuels
the long-standing controversies over the role of environmental outcomes
in sustaining economic growth over the long term (Panayotou and Vincent,
1997; Panayotou, 2000), whether environmental gains must come at the
expense of competitiveness (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Jaffe et al.,
1995; Esty and Porter, 1998), and the contours of the optimal environmental
strategies for developing countries. More sophisticated metrics together
with objective ways to gauge the success of environmental policies offer
a constructive way forward in this highly contentious arena in which
divergent points of view are strongly held (Esty, 2002).
In this paper, we take a step towards developing a set of empirical
tools to identify the key policy options and to test their links to improved
1 These ‘indicator’ efforts include: the Environmental Sustainability Index
developed by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy and Columbia
University’s Center for International Earth Science Information Network in
collaboration with the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2001; Esty et al., 2005);
the Living Planet Campaign sponsored by the World Wildlife Fund (Ricketts,
1999); the ‘Weight of Nations’ study conducted by the World Resources Institute
with partners in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Japan (Hammond
et al., 1995); initiatives by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (1993, 1998) and the UN Commission on Sustainable Development
(1996); the International Institute for Sustainable Development (Bossel, 1999);
the informal ‘Consultative Group on Sustainable Development Indicators’
(International Institute for Sustainable Development, 1999); the UN Environment
Programme (Bakkes et al., 1994); the European Union (Eurostat, 1999); the
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (1998, 1999) (Verfaille and
Bidwell, 2000); and the Boston-based CERES group (1997) as well as a number
of national sustainable development councils and projects. A few studies have
begun to analyze the links between corporate environmental performance and
corporate proﬁtability, most notably the corporate environmental rankings done
by INNOVEST (Dixon, 2002) and by the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (2000).
Some efforts have beenmade tounderstandpartial determinants of environmental
quality (Panayotou andVincent, 1997). The analysis presented here builds on prior
efforts of Esty and Porter (2000, 2002). Earlier versions of the present analysis
appeared in the 2001 Global Competitiveness Report (Esty and Porter, 2001) and
(Esty and Cornelius, 2002).
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environmental performance. In particular, using statistical methods, we
examine differences in environmental results as measured by levels of air
pollution (looking at both particulates and SO2) and energy use across
countries. We seek to explain these differences by analyzing cross-country
variations in policy choices and regulatory structures.
Although the data are imperfect, the statistical methods employed are
necessarily crude, and the lack of time series data prevents a deﬁnitive test
of causality, a number of interesting relationships emerge. Consistent with
the EKC literature, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between income and
environmental performance, suggesting that alleviating poverty should be
seen as a priority for environmental policy makers. Moreover, our data also
reveal dramatic differences in environmental performance among countries
at similar economic levels. This ﬁnding suggests that environmental results
are not merely a function of economic development but also a consequence
of policy choices. Indeed, this initial effort to identify what – other than
income – determines environmental policy results emerges as the central
contribution of our analysis. In this regard, a country’s broader economic
system, legal structure, and other institutional underpinnings appear to
signiﬁcantly shape environmental performance. On the purported trade-
off between being ‘green’ and being competitive, we ﬁnd no evidence that
improving environmental quality compromises economic progress. To the
contrary, strong environmental performance is positively correlated with
competitiveness.
Modeling environmental performance and its causes
Environmental output data are notoriously spotty, unreliable, and uneven,
as aredata on the characteristics of national regulatory regimes. Establishing
a sufﬁcient database for a broad empirical analysis is therefore no small
undertaking.2 Looking across dozens of possible variables in the ESI
data set, we found just three measures of environmental performance
that seemed reliable enough and available for a large enough number
of countries to be of use in our analysis. The ﬁrst is urban particulate
(airborne dust) concentrations, derived fromWorld Bank andWorldHealth
Organization (WHO) data. This variable provides a measure of the average
particulate concentration in the air (airborne dust) of each country’s cities.
A higher concentration indicates more pollution and thus worse air quality.
The second usable performance measure is mean urban sulfur dioxide
(SO2) concentrations.3 This measure is also drawn from World Bank and
WHO data. Again, higher ﬁgures represent worse air pollution. Our third
2 For a more complete discussion of the data gaps that plague the environmental
domain, see World Economic Forum (2002; Esty et al., 2005).
3 Particulates and SO2 are both core elements of air pollution,making ambient levels
a direct measure of environmental performance. We focus on urban pollution
levels because it is in cities where data are collected and where public health
issues arise. As appendix A discusses, our ﬁgures for each country are based on
weighted (by population) average concentrations across all cities in a country
where measurements are available.
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environmental performance measure gauges energy efﬁciency.4 Using US
Department of Energy data, we measure total energy consumption per unit
of a country’s GDP. Higher ﬁgures represent more energy consumed per
unit of economic output and thus greater energy inefﬁciency and weaker
environmental performance.5 Urban particulate data are available for 42
countries. The SO2 rankings cover 47 countries. Energy usage data are
available for 71 countries.6
We hypothesize that environmental performance results from two broad
sets of independent variables. As shown in ﬁgure 1, one set, which we
term the environmental regulatory regime, is comprised of measures of
various aspects of a country’s environmental regulatory system, including
standards, implementation and enforcement mechanisms, and associated
institutions. These variables capture regulatory elements that directly affect
pollution control and natural resource management.
The second set of independent variables, which we term economic and
legal context, contains indicators of a country’s more general administrative,
political, scientiﬁc, and technical capabilities and institutions. We thus
includemeasures of the extent towhich the rule of law is respected, property
rights are protected, and the country exhibits technological strength. These
variables permit us to test the hypothesis that a nation’s environmental
regulatory regime will be more effective if the economic and legal context
in which it operates is sound. The data for the independent variables
come from two sources: the World Economic Forum’s Environmental
Sustainability Index (WEF, 2002)7 and (2) the Global Competitiveness
4 Although energy use is not a direct pollution measure, it is an important indirect
measure of a society’s environmental focus and performance. This variable
provides a gauge of the eco-efﬁciency or resource productivity of a society,
especially when denominated by GDP. Energy consumption is, moreover, highly
correlated with many types of pollution, most notably greenhouse gas emissions.
It is also highly regulated in all societies – from carbon taxes in a few countries
such as Sweden, to gasoline taxes across most of the world, to corporate average
fuel efﬁciency (CAFE) standards for vehicles in the United States, to appliance
efﬁciency labeling requirements in the United States and elsewhere.
5 In comparing this measure across countries, we need to account for the fact that
Russia and the countries of the former Soviet bloc operated for decades under an
energy regime with prices set well below market prices. This history has left a
legacy of energy inefﬁciency in these countries that is only slowly being corrected.
We therefore include a dummy variable in our model to control for this history,
which proves to be highly signiﬁcant statistically.
6 Almost all prior studies of the determinants of environmental performance have
relied on much smaller numbers of countries. The size of this analysis (42–
71 countries) represents an important step forward, but it creates some difﬁculties
as all of the data sets must then have comparable breadth.
7 The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) initiative was undertaken by the
World Economic Forum’s Global Leaders for Tomorrow Environmental Task
Force, based on methodologies developed by the Yale Center for Environmental
Law and Policy (YCELP) and the Center for International Earth Science
Information Network at Columbia University (CIESIN). It draws on data sets
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Report (GCR) survey8 of almost 4,000 business and government leaders
in more than 50 countries.
The dotted arrows in ﬁgure 1 represent the ﬁnal stage of the analysis,
in which we examine the connection between environmental results and
economic success. In particular, we explore the relationship between our
speciﬁed environmental performancemeasures andGDPper capita, aswell
as the relationship between an index measuring the overall environmental
regulatory regime, theEnvironmentalRegulatoryRegime Index (ERRI), and
GDP per capita. We also examine the relationship between the ERRI and a
measure of national competitiveness (Porter et al., 2001). These relationships
shed light on the long-standing debate over the extent of the trade-off
between environmental progress and economic success – a question of
particular interest in the developing world.
Measures of environmental performance
Table 1 provides absolute rankings by country for each of the three
environmental performance measures.9 Figures 2, 3, and 4 plot the
relationship between each measure of environmental performance and
GDP per capita. One pattern is immediately discernable across all three
measures: richer countries achieve better results than poorer ones. The
improvement of environmental performance as income rises is most
pronounced with regard to urban particulates and energy efﬁciency
and least strong for SO2 emissions. Among lower-income countries, the
variance on all three measures is particularly high relative to that of more
Organization, and other public and private institutions. For more detail, see
the 2002 ESI at www.yale.edu/envirocenter/esi or www.ciesin.columbia.edu/
indicators/esi.
8 While cross-country survey data have well-understood limitations, the World
Economic Forum survey – carried out by researchers from Harvard University
with partner organizations from more than 50 countries – draws on the views of
top business leaders, many of whom work for multinational companies and have
experience across many countries. Similarly, the government leaders surveyed
almost all work in a context that provides them with a perspective on the
economies and regulatory systems of many countries. To assess the validity of
responses within countries, we conducted an ANOVA analysis for each GCR
survey measure. Regressing individual survey responses on a complete set of
country dummy variables allows us to calculate the share of the variation (across
individual responses) that results from systematic difference in the average
response across countries. With an average of more than 60 respondents per
country, the degree of within-country consensus is striking. For all measures,
the proportion of variation due to country differences is statistically signiﬁcant.
For two-thirds of the variables used in our analysis, more than 30 per cent of the
overall variation in the responses is driven by country-speciﬁc differences for that
measure. For the regulatory stringency variables and some others, the proportion
is 50 per cent or more.
9 Both the US and the UK track smaller particulates (2.5 micron versus 10 micron)
than those monitored by the rest of the world. The US and UK emphasis follows
the most recent medical evidence, which suggests that it is the smaller particles










Table 1. Absolute environmental performance by country
Urban particulate concentration∗ Urban SO2 concentration∗ Energy usage
(per city population) (per city population) (per mil. $ GDP)
Rank Country Annual mean Rank Country Annual mean Rank Country Bil. Btu
1 Sweden 9.0 1 Argentina 1.02 1 Denmark 4.84
2 Norway 10.3 2 Lithuania 2.10 2 Switzerland 5.19
3 France 14.2 3 New Zealand 3.49 3 Japan 6.55
4 Iceland 24.0 4 Finland 4.38 4 Italy 6.66
5 New Zealand 27.3 5 Iceland 5.00 5 Ireland 6.85
6 Switzerland 30.7 6 Sweden 5.23 6 Austria 7.09
7 Canada 31.3 7 Latvia 5.36 7 Germany 7.28
8 Netherlands 40.0 8 Norway 5.47 8 France 7.39
9 Australia 43.2 9 Denmark 7.00 9 Finland 8.37
10 Germany 43.3 10 Portugal 9.22 10 United Kingdom 8.59
11 Japan 43.6 11 Netherlands 10.00 11 Spain 8.73
12 Austria 45.7 12 Romania 10.00 12 Honduras 8.97
13 Finland 49.9 13 Spain 11.00 13 Mauritius 9.11
14 Argentina 50.0 14 Thailand 11.00 14 Sweden 9.14
15 Portugal 50.4 15 Switzerland 11.34 15 Israel 9.96
16 Venezuela 53.0 16 Germany 12.80 16 Peru 10.81
17 Czech Republic 58.4 17 Canada 12.87 17 Netherlands 11.01
18 Denmark 61.0 18 Australia 13.17 18 Slovenia 11.26
19 Hungary 63.7 19 Austria 13.21 19 Australia 11.46
20 Slovak Republic 64.5 20 France 13.89 20 Guatemala 11.52
21 Spain 72.7 21 United States 15.43 21 Portugal 11.77
22 Romania 82.0 22 Italy 15.55 22 Belgium 11.83
23 Korea 83.8 23 Ireland 18.89 23 Norway 12.17












Urban particulate concentration∗ Urban SO2 concentration∗ Energy usage
(per city population) (per city population) (per mil. $ GDP)
Rank Country Annual mean Rank Country Annual mean Rank Country Bil. Btu
25 Malaysia 91.6 25 Malaysia 20.49 25 Uruguay 12.86
26 Latvia 100.0 26 Belgium 21.02 26 Greece 12.95
27 Russia 100.0 27 Ecuador 21.52 27 Bangladesh 13.15
28 Brazil 106.2 28 United Kingdom 21.96 28 United States 13.41
29 Lithuania 114.3 29 South Africa 22.37 29 Sri Lanka 13.70
30 Colombia 120.0 30 Slovak Republic 22.66 30 El Salvador 13.75
31 Ecuador 125.7 31 Japan 24.33 31 Brazil 14.01
32 Greece 178.0 32 Czech Republic 27.34 32 Iceland 14.49
33 Bulgaria 199.2 33 India 27.55 33 New Zealand 15.09
34 Philippines 200.0 34 Chile 29.00 34 Paraguay 15.32
35 Thailand 223.0 35 Philippines 33.00 35 Estonia 16.09
36 Costa Rica 244.5 36 Venezuela 33.00 36 Costa Rica 16.13
37 Indonesia 271.0 37 Greece 34.00 37 Chile 16.63
38 Guatemala 272.3 38 Hungary 37.33 38 Canada 17.54
39 India 277.5 39 Costa Rica 38.84 39 Mexico 17.72
40 Mexico 279.0 40 Korea 52.41 40 Korea 17.91
41 China 310.8 41 Bulgaria 52.45 41 Bolivia 18.41
42 Honduras 320.0 42 Poland 54.72 42 Dominican Republic 18.68
43 Egypt 69.00 43 Panama 18.70
44 Mexico 74.00 44 Thailand 19.29
45 Brazil 75.78 45 Philippines 19.74
46 China 97.07 46 Singapore 20.41



























65 Czech Republic 56.22
66 Romania 58.39
67 Bulgaria 60.71
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 y   =  84.76+41.57*dum 
          7.36*Ln(x)
 R2  =  0.71
Note:      Former Soviet Bloc
Figure 4. Relationship between energy usage and GDP per capita (log model)
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prosperous countries. This suggests that environmental performance can
be substantially improved in many low-income countries, independent of
the gains that come with economic development.
The regression relationship between environmental performance and
GDP per capita provides an interesting perspective on how each country
performs relative to its wealth. Countries above the regression line in
ﬁgures 2, 3, and 4 exhibit weaker environmental results on the particular
performance measure than would be expected given their level of GDP;
those countries below the regression line demonstrate better-than-income-
would-suggest performance. These results (reporting residuals from the
regression line) are shown in tables 2, 3, and 4.
With regard to particulate levels, Italy, Denmark, Greece, Costa Rica,
Mexico, and China are notable laggards relative to income. Sweden,
Argentina, Latvia, Ecuador, and Venezuela show relatively strong
performance. In terms of SO2 results, Japan, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Korea,
China, and Egypt lag relative to income. Belgium and the United States
are also weak performers. Finland, Sweden, Argentina, Iceland, Latvia,
Lithuania, Thailand, Romania, and Ecuador perform relatively well. In
energy efﬁciency, Denmark, Italy, Switzerland, Japan, Hungary, Poland,
Honduras, and Bangladesh appear to be more energy efﬁcient than would
be expected given their level of income. The United States, Canada, Russia,
South Africa, Venezuela, Ukraine, and Vietnam emerge as poor performers
relative to income. As can be seen in Figure 4, the dummy variable for
former Soviet bloc countries is highly signiﬁcant, suggesting that countries
that faced constrained energy markets and artiﬁcially low energy prices
suffered a common fate of structural inefﬁciency.
These ﬁndings comport with established economic theory, which
suggests that pollution control improves with development (World
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987; Shaﬁk and Bandy-
opadhyay, 1992). The data do not, however, reveal an inverted U-shaped
environmental ‘Kuznets curve’. A number of other studies have found such
a pattern, characterized by rising emissions in the early stages of devel-
opment and improving environmental performance after middle-income
levels have been reached (Seldon and Song, 1994; Grossman and Krueger,
1995; Harbaugh et al., 2000). These results may be explained by the fact
that our sample of countries contains relatively few countries in the ‘early
industrialization’ stage of development, in which emissions and energy
usage would be low and rising, especially for the air pollution measures.
The apparent relationship between environmental performance and
level of development supports several preliminary but important policy
conclusions. First, the evidence that poorer countries do lesswell on all three
environmental performance measures supports an emphasis on alleviating
poverty as a core environmental policy goal. Quite clearly, richer countries
not only can, but do, invest in pollution control and other environmental
improvements.
Second, the wide variations in environmental performance among
countries at similar levels of economic development suggest that a
country’s incomeor development stage affects but does not alonedetermine











Table 2. Energy usage relative to expected given GDP per capita, listed by income groups
Low income countries (≤$6,500) Middle income countries ($6,500–23,000) High income countries (≥$23,000)
Rank Country Residual Rank Country Residual Rank Country Residual
1 Honduras −18.29 1 Hungary −24.70 1 Denmark −4.78
2 Bangladesh −17.48 2 Poland −14.29 2 Italy −4.08
3 Guatemala −12.60 3 Mauritius −8.22 3 Switzerland −4.06
4 Peru −11.57 4 Lithuania −6.24 4 Japan −3.44
5 Nigeria −11.28 5 Brazil −5.19 5 Ireland −3.31
6 Sri Lanka −10.96 6 Uruguay −4.96 6 France −3.12
7 El Salvador −9.13 7 Spain −3.44 7 Germany −2.96
8 Bolivia −9.04 8 Argentina −3.21 8 Austria −2.75
9 Paraguay −7.69 9 Israel −2.06 9 United Kingdom −2.18
10 Zimbabwe −4.27 10 Slovenia −1.74 10 Finland −1.89
11 Philippines −4.05 11 Estonia −1.51 11 Sweden −1.42
12 Romania −3.53 12 Costa Rica −1.42 12 Netherlands 0.96
13 Indonesia −2.84 13 Portugal −1.34 13 Australia 1.46
14 Bulgaria −2.26 14 Chile −0.96 14 Belgium 2.16
15 Dominican Republic −2.09 15 Greece −0.41 15 Norway 3.17
16 Panama −1.82 16 Mexico −0.09 16 Iceland 5.41
17 Thailand −0.88 17 Czech Republic 0.02 17 United States 5.43
18 India 0.67 18 New Zealand 3.24 18 Canada 8.10
19 Ecuador 1.90 19 Korea 4.98
20 Colombia 3.17 20 Malaysia 5.08
21 Egypt 6.55 21 Latvia 5.25
22 Nicaragua 8.98 22 Slovak Republic 6.14
23 Jordan 10.96 23 Singapore 9.58
24 Jamaica 11.21 24 Russia 14.20













Table 3. Urban particulate concentration relative to expected given GDP per capita, listed by income groups∗
Low income countries (≤$6,500) Middle income countries ($6,500–23,000) High income countries (≥$23,000)
Rank Country Residual Rank Country Residual Rank Country Residual
1 Venezuela −121.87 1 Latvia −57.59 1 Sweden −32.50
2 Ecuador −106.27 2 Argentina −52.99 2 France −26.77
3 Romania −83.06 3 Slovak Republic −48.69 3 Norway −11.65
4 Colombia −50.93 4 Brazil −44.20 4 Iceland 1.05
5 Philippines −8.40 5 Malaysia −41.31 5 Canada 3.80
6 Bulgaria 20.92 6 Lithuania −41.17 6 Netherlands 4.93
7 India 22.78 7 Russia −40.59 7 Switzerland 5.62
8 Indonesia 37.35 8 Hungary −39.10 8 Germany 5.75
9 Guatemala 59.80 9 Czech Republic −34.57 9 Australia 8.73
10 Thailand 60.26 10 New Zealand −30.61 10 Japan 9.28
11 Honduras 67.85 11 Portugal −23.31 11 Finland 12.13
12 China 102.36 12 Spain 10.93 12 Austria 13.20
13 Korea 12.41 13 Denmark 31.29
14 Greece 101.19 14 Italy 43.13
15 Costa Rica 114.79
16 Mexico 146.02











Table 4. Urban SO2 concentration relative to expected given GDP per capita, listed by income groups∗
Low income countries (≤$6,500) Middle income countries ($6,500–23,000) High income countries (≥$23,000)
Rank Country Residual Rank Country Residual Rank Country Residual
1 Ecuador −28.49 1 Lithuania −34.29 1 Finland −11.07
2 Romania −28.10 2 Latvia −31.41 2 Sweden −10.89
3 Thailand −26.69 3 Argentina −26.04 3 Iceland −7.81
4 India −26.49 4 New Zealand −15.54 4 Norway −7.16
5 Philippines −12.81 5 Portugal −12.63 5 Denmark −7.02
6 Venezuela −6.84 6 Malaysia −11.88 6 Netherlands −4.97
7 Bulgaria 11.99 7 South Africa −9.52 7 Germany −2.60
8 Egypt 21.64 8 Spain −8.72 8 France −2.12
9 China 51.25 9 Slovak Republic −6.21 9 Switzerland −1.85
10 Chile −2.89 10 Australia −1.70
11 Czech Republic 2.07 11 Austria −1.31
12 Singapore 3.26 12 Italy −0.97
13 Costa Rica 7.03 13 Canada −0.75
14 Hungary 10.30 14 Ireland 3.67
15 Greece 11.60 15 United States 5.09
16 Poland 22.43 16 United Kingdom 5.37
17 Korea 30.98 17 Belgium 6.91
18 Brazil 40.29 18 Japan 9.49
19 Mexico 41.61
20 Russia 63.80
Note: ∗ Not all data were available for all countries.
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to advance environmental quality ahead of their economic progress; others
have not. Similarly, some developing countries appear to have achieved
strong environmental performance relative to their level of development,
while other countries seem to be unduly sacriﬁcing the environment in
the pursuit of economic growth. In any case, it appears that at every
income level, there are important environmental choices and broader policy
decisions to be made – and that some countries are systematically choosing
well, while others are not. This conclusion represents an important step
beyond the existing EKC literature.
Third, income-driven improvements in environmental performance
seem to emerge most quickly for the most localized problem (particulates)
and least rapidly with regard to energy impacts, in which a signiﬁcant
element of harm (notably greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel
burning) spreads widely over space and time. Intermediate results occur
for the (SO2) variable with harms that arise on an intermediate spatial
and temporal scale. This pattern tracks the theoretical prediction that the
geographic and temporal spread of an environmental issue represents
critical policy variables. Where harms have a signiﬁcant transboundary
or inter-temporal dimension, they constitute ‘super externalities’, which
generate special collective action problems that often prove difﬁcult to
address (Dua and Esty, 1997).
Determinants of environmental performance
The conclusion that income levels do not fully explain the variance in
environmental performance leads us to our central inquiry: what are the
other determinants of environmental results? To answer this question, we
assemble data on policy variables that could determine environmental out-
come, building on theoretical work in the economic, legal, regulatory, and
environmental domains. As noted above, the independent variables in the
model consist of twobroadgroups: (1)measures of a nation’s environmental
regulatory regime and (2) measures of its economic and legal context.10
The regulatory regime can be divided into a number of elements:
 stringency of pollution standards
 sophistication of the regulatory structure
 availability of relevant policy-making information
 subsidization of natural resources
 strictness of regulatory enforcement
 capacity of a country’s environmental institutions
The ‘stringency of standards’ category includes measures (drawn from
the GCR survey) of the perceived rigor of a nation’s regulations on air
pollution, water pollution, toxic waste, and chemicals.We expect a negative
relationship between each of themeasures of regulatory stringency and our
dependent variables, since more rigorous standards should lead to lower
levels of urban particulates, lower SO2 concentrations, and lower energy
usage per unit of GDP.
10 The full list of variables used in the analysis along with their deﬁnitions and
sources are given in appendix A.
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The ‘regulatory structure’ category seeks tomeasure thedegree towhich a
nation’s environmental regulations are ﬂexible, clear, consistent, structured
to aid competitiveness, and designed to promote cooperative versus
adversarial business–government relations. In each case, we anticipate
a negative relationship between these variables and our measures of
environmental performance because a more reﬁned and sophisticated
regulatory structure is expected to produce less pollution andmore efﬁcient
energy usage.
The ‘information’ category attempts to measure the degree to which a
nation has the data needed for policymaking and to support enforcement of
environmental regulations. There are nodirectmeasures of the quality of the
information underlying each country’s environmental regime.We therefore
rely on four proxy variables drawn from the ESI data set: (1) the degree to
which a country collects data in the 65 categories tracked by the ESI analysis;
(2) the extent to which a nation generates sustainable development inform-
ation and the existence of plans to support national environmental decision
making (as called for in the Rio Earth Summit’s Agenda 21 process); (3) the
prevalence of guidelines for sectoral environmental impact assessments;
and (4) the breadth of environmental action plans. All of these information
indicators are relatively crude, but provide some basis for gauging whether
a nation seeks to make environmental judgments on an analytically
rigorous basis.We expect a negative relationship between these information
variables and our environmental performance measures, such that better
information leads to less pollution and improved energy efﬁciency.
The ‘subsidies’ measure derives from the GCR survey data the extent
to which a country subsidizes energy and other materials. Where price
signals are distorted we expect to see greater inefﬁciency and higher levels
of pollution. We thus anticipate a positive relationship between the level of
subsidies and particulate levels, SO2 concentrations, and energy usage.
The ‘strictness of enforcement’ measures are also drawn from the GCR
survey. The ﬁrst measure gauges how aggressively a nation’s domestic
environmental regulations are enforced, and the second provides an
indicator of the depth of a country’s commitment to treaty requirements
and other international environmental obligations. We expect a negative
relationship between these measures of enforcement rigor and our
dependent variables, as those countries which take environmental
regulations seriously (whetherdomestic or international) should experience
better pollution control and energy usage results.
The ﬁnal regulatory regime category, ‘institutional capacity’, seeks to
measure the degree to which inter-governmental organizations and non-
governmental entities (environmental groups, community organizations,
business associations, and other elements of civil society) reinforce a
country’s environmental efforts. The mechanisms for such reinforcement
are diverse (Esty, 1998). In some cases, these entities directly undertake
environmental activities and thus substitute for governmental action.
Environmental groups, for instance, may identify harms, highlight issues
that demand attention, gather and analyze data, or throw a spotlight on
poor environmental performance. NGOs may also indirectly strengthen
a society’s capacity for pollution control by providing environmental
education to the public or technical assistance to polluters or government
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agencies. Of course, such entities may play counter-productive roles,
unnecessarily increasing environmental costs. Such negative outcomes
should be anticipated if they pursue extreme positions, distort the decision-
making process, or utilize adversarial and divisive policy approaches.
Our capacity to measure institutional capacity is limited. The variables
in this category are therefore somewhat crude proxies. We use data on
the number of entities (scaled by population) that participate in the World
Conservation Union (IUCN), an umbrella organization of environmental
NGOs and research centers. We also draw on ESI data that provide a
measure of the breadth of a country’s engagement with inter-governmental
environmental bodies. A third institutional quality variable comes from the
GCR survey data on the extent to which a nation’s companies utilize the
ISO 14000 certiﬁcation process for environmentalmanagement.We expect a
negative relationship between thesemeasures and our dependent variables.
Economic and legal context
The second broad group of independent variables tracks potentially
signiﬁcant dimensions of a country’s economic and legal context. Our
analysis in this regard draws on a growing theoretical literature that focuses
on ‘governance’ (Annan, 1997; Sachs, 1998), which suggests that a country’s
underlyingpolitical, legal, and economic structuresmay contribute asmuch
to environmental protection as the details of its regulatory regime (Esty,
1997; Panayotou, 1997; Esty and Porter, 2000).
Under the economic and legal context, there are two categories of
variables. First, we analyze what we call administrative infrastructure.
In this category, we assemble data on civil and political liberties drawn
from the ESI and measures from the GCR survey of public sector
competence, the degree of governmental favoritism, the extent of private
property protection, the independence of the judiciary, demands for
irregular payments as a price for doing business, burdensome regulations,
corruption, the extent of the rule of law, and the degree to which new
governments honor the obligations of prior administrations. For each
of these variables, we anticipate a negative relationship vis-a`-vis our
environmental performance measures.
The second group of variables under legal and economic context
addresses various aspects of a country’s scientiﬁc and technical capacity. It is
again hard tomeasure scientiﬁc sophistication and analytic rigor directly, so
we rely upon a series of proxies, including data on the number of scientists
and engineers (scaled by population) in each country and survey data
that provide a gauge of a country’s technological development, intellectual
property protection, research and development spending, willingness to
absorb new technologies, business commitment to innovation, the strength
of its scientiﬁc community, the degree to which foreign technology is
commonly licensed, and governmental focus on technology development
and innovation.We expect each of thesemeasures of scientiﬁc and technical
capacity to be negatively correlated with environmental impacts, as greater
analytic strength should lead to better environmental performance.
As we have tried to make clear, the independent variables are far from
perfect measures of the potential determinants of national environmental
outcomes. These variables – drawn from data collected by a variety
410 Daniel C. Esty and Michael E. Porter
of international bodies such as the World Bank and the World Health
Organization – are, however, the best ones currently available. Despite
the limitations, these data allow us to begin to identify empirically the
determinants of a nation’s success in controlling pollution and improving
resource productivity.
Statistical methodology
Our analytic approach unfolds in several stages. First, we use bilateral
regressions (tables 5, 6, and 7) to explore whether there is a statistically
signiﬁcant relationship between each independent variable and energy
usage, urbanparticulate levels, and SO2 concentrations. Because our sample
sizes of 40–70 countries are relatively small in comparison to the number of
explanatory variables, we have limited degrees of freedom. Moreover, the
fact that many of our independent variables are highly correlated limits our
ability to use multiple regression techniques to examine the joint inﬂuence
of the variables (Rawlings et al., 1998). Instead, as a second stage of analysis,
we ‘roll up’ the signiﬁcant independent variable in each category into a sub-
index using common factor analysis. Then, we regress these sub-indices
against the dependent variables.11 Finally, the statistically signiﬁcant sub-
indices are rolled up into an overall environmental regulatory regime index
(ERRI) and an overall economic and legal context index (ELCI).
In light of the signiﬁcant association between per capita GDP and
environmental performance, we analyze performance relative to a peer
group of countries deﬁned by income level. We regress ERRI against GDP
per capita (graphed in ﬁgure 6) and calculate the residuals (distance above
or below the regression line) for each country (table 9). This provides a way
of analyzing how each country’s environmental regime performs against
expectations established by its income level.
Results for individual measures and indexes
The bilateral regression results are shown in tables 5, 6, and 7.12 As table 5
highlights, a large number of the independent variables show a statistically
signiﬁcant relationship with energy usage, with the expected negative sign
and a reasonable degree of explained variance. All of the elements of
the regulatory stringency category show particular signiﬁcance, as do the
enforcement variables.Most of the regulatory structuremeasures also prove
11 In developing the category sub-indices, we use only those variables that appear
appropriately grouped, based on eigen value analysis, as shown in the factor
analysis results given in appendix B. Thus, in developing the regulatory stringency
sub-index, we drop the overall regulation measure. The sectoral EIA guidelines
measure and the environmental strategies and action plans measure drop
out of the information sub-index. The measure of civil liberties, public sector
competence, irregular payments, and regulatory burden are all dropped from the
administrative infrastructure sub-index. And the scientists/engineers, licensing
of foreign technology, and business innovation measures fall out of the technical
capacity sub-index. Appendix B reports the percentage of covariance illustrated
by the ﬁrst factor and the ﬁrst factor coefﬁcient for each index variable.
12 GMM estimation instead of OLS estimation is used due to the presence of
heteroscedeasticity.
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Table 5. Bilateral regressions: energy usage∗
2001
Dependent variable: energy
usage (per unit GDP)
(β) R2 Sig. df
Environmental Regulatory Regime Index −5.281 0.67 0.000 68
Stringency Sub-Index −5.632 0.68 0.000 68
Air Regulation −4.044 0.69 0.000 68
Water Regulation −3.859 0.68 0.000 68
Toxic Waste Regulation −3.576 0.67 0.000 68
Chemical Regulation −3.902 0.68 0.000 68
Overall Regulation −3.917 0.67 0.000 68
Regulatory Structure Sub-Index −4.480 0.64 0.002 68
Options for Compliance −4.005 0.60 0.102 68
Confusing and Changing −4.982 0.65 0.001 68
Early or Late −4.058 0.67 0.000 68
Compliance Hurts or Helps Competitiveness −6.094 0.62 0.016 68
Regulation Adversarial or Cooperative −6.355 0.63 0.007 68
Information Sub-Index −2.507 0.61 0.081 68
ESI-Variables %-available −0.271 0.62 0.020 68
Sustainable Development Info −1.009 0.58 0.764 41
Number of Sectoral EIA Guidelines 0.041 0.59 0.923 68
Number of Environmental Strategies & −0.197 0.59 0.815 68
Action Plans
Subsidies Sub-Index
Government Subsidies 7.065 0.66 0.000 68
Regulatory Enforcement Sub-Index −4.466 0.65 0.001 68
Enforcement −3.890 0.65 0.001 68
International Agreements −3.976 0.64 0.002 68
Environmental Institutions Sub-Index −4.740 0.65 0.001 68
IUCN −1.392 0.60 0.300 68
Memberships −0.699 0.65 0.001 67
Prevalence of ISO 14000 −3.994 0.63 0.011 68
Economic and Legal Context Index −4.836 0.65 0.001 68
Administrative Infrastructure Quality Index −5.647 0.68 0.000 68
Civil Liberties −5.190 0.75 0.000 68
Public Sector Competence −2.383 0.59 0.333 68
Gov’t Favor Private Sector Firms −4.200 0.64 0.003 68
Property Rights −4.756 0.71 0.000 68
Independent Judiciary −3.426 0.66 0.000 68
Irregular Payments −4.973 0.68 0.000 68
Legal Framework −3.880 0.66 0.000 68
Regulatory Burden −5.144 0.63 0.006 68
Level of Administrative Corruption −5.695 0.69 0.000 68
Honoring of Policies through Gov. Transition −4.558 0.65 0.001 68
Scientiﬁc and Research Infrastructure Index −3.788 0.63 0.008 68
Scientists and Engineers −0.003 0.64 0.004 64
Technology Position −3.636 0.66 0.000 68
Institutions −3.341 0.62 0.018 68
Licensing of Foreign Technology −3.692 0.61 0.055 68
Company R & D Spending −4.207 0.64 0.002 68
Willingness to Absorb New Technology −3.803 0.62 0.033 68
Importance of Innovation to Revenue −6.158 0.62 0.020 68
Gov’t Purchase Decisions for Tech. Products −2.962 0.60 0.160 68
Note: ∗ Refer to appendix A for deﬁnitions of variables.
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to be highly signiﬁcant. These categories of variables account for the highest
amount of explained variance. The subsidies variable is highly signiﬁcant
and has the expected positive sign. This result suggests, consistent with
economic theory, that mispriced resources will be inefﬁciently used and
that subsidies represent a major policy error.
The information and institutional capacity measures perform less well.
In the information category, one variable, percentage of ESI variables
available, emerges as signiﬁcant, while the other three measures do not.
In the institutional category, IUCN membership fails to show signiﬁcance,
while the other two measures are signiﬁcant.
Among the economic and legal context variables, all but one, public sector
competence, emerge as highly signiﬁcant with the expected negative sign.
The new variables measuring corruption and whether new governments
honor the commitments of prior administrations prove to be statistically
signiﬁcant. In the scientiﬁc and technical capacity category, all of the
variables except one, government commitment to technology development
and innovation, show a reasonable degree of signiﬁcance and the expected
negative sign.
All of the sub-indices are highly signiﬁcant in explaining energy usage,
have the expected negative sign, and account for substantial explained vari-
ance.13 TheERRI andELCI register similarly high levels of signiﬁcance,with
the expected negative signs and a substantial degree of explained variance.
Although preliminary, the latter results provide some empirical support
for the hypothesis that a nation’s underlying economic and legal structure
may be as important to environmental success as the speciﬁc details of
its environmental regulatory regime. This conclusion argues for more
attention to setting development priorities and to targeting development
assistance for structural ‘fundamentals’, such as eliminating corruption and
building functioning market economies, and for ‘governance’ issues, such
as strengthening the rule of law and developing mechanisms to protect
property rights.
The ERRI and the ELCI prove to be highly correlated and show
similar levels of signiﬁcance and explained variance. Hence it appears
that environmental regulation and the overall economic and legal context
generally improve in parallel. The high correlation between the two indices
(as shown in ﬁgure 5) means that their independent effects could not be
distinguished statistically.
Table 6 presents the second set of bilateral regressions for urban
particulate concentrations. Again, the vast majority of variables are
signiﬁcant with the expected sign and account for a reasonable degree
of explained variance. All of the measures of regulatory stringency and
structure are highly signiﬁcant, with the stringency variables accounting
for the greatest level of explained variance. The subsidies measure emerges
as highly signiﬁcant, has the anticipated positive sign, and accounts for a
reasonable degree of explained variance.
In the information category, two variables show signiﬁcance with the
expected negative sign, but they do not account for as high a degree of
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Figure 5. Relationship between the environmental regulatory regime index and economic and legal context index
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Table 6. Bilateral regressions: urban particulates∗
2001
Dependent variable: urban
particulates (per city pop)
(β) R2 Sig. df
Environmental Regulatory Regime Index −58.19 0.44 0.000 40
Stringency Sub-Index −67.58 0.52 0.000 40
Air Regulation −46.86 0.52 0.000 40
Water Regulation −46.44 0.53 0.000 40
Toxic Waste Regulation −45.10 0.52 0.000 40
Chemical Regulation −46.24 0.51 0.000 40
Overall Regulation −47.54 0.51 0.000 40
Regulatory Structure Sub-Index −52.54 0.35 0.000 40
Options for Compliance −89.06 0.33 0.000 40
Confusing and Changing −60.31 0.42 0.000 40
Early or Late −45.23 0.47 0.000 40
Compliance Hurts or Helps Competitiveness −61.14 0.17 0.007 40
Regulation Adversarial or Cooperative −46.15 0.12 0.028 40
Information Sub-Index −56.07 0.22 0.002 40
ESI-Variables %-available −3.86 0.15 0.011 40
Sustainable Development Info −58.76 0.18 0.028 25
Number of Sectoral EIA Guidelines −0.99 0.00 0.825 40
Number of Environmental Strategies & 4.94 0.01 0.525 40
Action Plans
Subsidies Sub-Index
Government Subsidies 65.95 0.31 0.000 40
Regulatory Enforcement Sub-Index −58.31 0.43 0.000 40
Enforcement −52.79 0.45 0.000 40
International Agreements −49.93 0.38 0.000 40
Environmental Institutions Sub-Index −47.86 0.29 0.000 40
IUCN −16.40 0.05 0.150 40
Memberships −6.40 0.22 0.002 39
Prevalence of ISO 14000 −47.01 0.25 0.001 40
Economic and Legal Context Index −58.94 0.40 0.000 40
Administrative Infrastructure Quality Index −57.48 0.39 0.000 40
Civil Liberties −42.67 0.37 0.000 40
Public Sector Competence −42.49 0.07 0.095 40
Gov’t Favor Private Sector Firms −53.99 0.36 0.000 40
Property Rights −45.62 0.48 0.000 40
Independent Judiciary −32.47 0.30 0.000 40
Irregular Payments −59.91 0.46 0.000 40
Legal Framework −40.45 0.35 0.000 40
Regulatory Burden −47.93 0.15 0.013 40
Level of Administrative Corruption −54.64 0.38 0.000 40
Honoring of Policies through Gov. Transition −43.16 0.24 0.001 40
Scientiﬁc and Research Infrastructure Index −58.15 0.38 0.000 40
Scientists and Engineers −0.04 0.42 0.000 39
Technology Position −42.94 0.40 0.000 40
Institutions −57.57 0.36 0.000 40
Licensing of Foreign Technology −56.20 0.15 0.010 40
Company R & D Spending −49.65 0.32 0.000 40
Willingness to Absorb New Technology −75.25 0.41 0.000 40
Importance of Innovation to Revenue −63.51 0.15 0.012 40
Gov’t Purchase Decisions for Tech. Products −68.82 0.26 0.001 40
Note: ∗ Refer to appendix A for deﬁnitions of variables.
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explained variance. In the institutional reinforcement category, the number
of IUCNmemberships is againnot signiﬁcant,while the other twovariables,
participation in inter-governmental environmental bodies and corporate
participation in environmental management systems, emerge as highly
signiﬁcant.
The regulatory stringency, regulatory structure, information enforce-
ment, and institutional sub-indices are all highly signiﬁcant, with the
expected negative sign, as is the cumulative ERRI. Across all of these sub-
indices, however, the degree of explained variance appears to be somewhat
lower in the urban particulate regressions than in the energy usage
ones. Two of the sub-indices – information foundations and institutional
reinforcement – perform notably less well than the others. This result
may arise from the fact that these variables are imperfect proxies or that
information and institutions play more mixed roles.
All of the variables in the economic and social context regression emerge
as signiﬁcant in the urban particulates analysis. All have the expected
negative sign, with many accounting for a substantial degree of explained
variance. The administrative infrastructure and technical capacity sub-
indices both show very high levels of signiﬁcance, the expected negative
sign, and a high degree of explained variance. The ELCI similarly emerges
as highly signiﬁcant. It accounts for almost as much explained variance
as the ERRI. However, both the ERRI and the ELCI explain a somewhat
smaller proportion of variations in urban particulate concentrations than
energy usage. Again, the independent effects of ERRI and ELCI could not
be distinguished statistically.
The SO2 regression results are presented in table 7. Most of the
independent variables are once again signiﬁcantwith the expected negative
sign. The degree of explained variance is, however, generally much lower
for SO2 than for either energy usage or particulate concentrations. This
ﬁnding may reﬂect the fact that the beneﬁts of SO2 control (reduced acid
rain) accrue downwind – frequently beyond the territorial boundaries of
the jurisdiction undertaking regulatory action. Thus, from a cost–beneﬁt
perspective, the regulating entity has less to gain from SO2 abatement than
from the control of particulates or from investments in energy efﬁciency,
both of which provide a substantial degree of localized beneﬁts.
The subsidies measure again shows a high level of signiﬁcance and the
expected positive sign, but accounts for a lower amount of variance than
the other measures of pollution. In the information category, three of the
four measures are not statistically signiﬁcant. The looser ﬁt may suggest
that even a well-informed government that is serious about environmental
protection has less of an incentive to address SO2, given its geographic
dispersion, than it does to tackle other more localized issues.
All of the environmental regulatory regime sub-indices are signiﬁcant
and have the expected negative sign in the SO2 regressions, but only
the regulatory stringency sub-index accounts for a reasonable degree
of explained variance. ERRI once again proves to be highly signiﬁcant,
although the degree of explained variance is not high. As a general matter,
the regression ﬁt for SO2 appears weaker than for particulates or for energy
usage, perhaps reﬂecting themore limited regulatory pay-offs noted above.
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Table 7. Bilateral regressions: urban SO2 concentration∗
2001
Dependent variable: urban
SO2 (per city pop)
(β) R2 Sig. df
Environmental Regulatory Regime Index −11.351 0.21 0.001 45
Stringency Sub-Index −13.857 0.28 0.000 45
Air Regulation −9.407 0.27 0.000 45
Water Regulation −9.592 0.28 0.000 45
Toxic Waste Regulation −9.283 0.27 0.000 45
Chemical Regulation −9.538 0.27 0.000 45
Overall Regulation −9.839 0.27 0.000 45
Regulatory Structure Sub-Index −9.686 0.16 0.005 45
Options for Compliance −9.312 0.05 0.130 45
Confusing and Changing −11.905 0.20 0.002 45
Early or Late −10.105 0.28 0.000 45
Compliance Hurts or Helps Competitiveness −11.584 0.09 0.038 45
Regulation Adversarial or Cooperative −11.128 0.11 0.022 45
Information Sub-Index −10.206 0.10 0.029 45
ESI-Variables %-available 0.207 0.00 0.662 45
Sustainable Development Info −21.624 0.25 0.004 29
Number of Sectoral EIA Guidelines −0.708 0.01 0.464 45
Number of Environmental Strategies & 0.722 0.00 0.732 45
Action Plans
Subsidies Sub-Index
Government Subsidies 12.301 0.15 0.008 45
Regulatory Enforcement Sub-Index −10.989 0.18 0.003 45
Enforcement −8.960 0.17 0.004 45
International Agreements −10.221 0.19 0.003 45
Environmental Institutions Sub-Index −6.921 0.08 0.053 45
IUCN −6.270 0.10 0.030 45
Memberships −0.684 0.04 0.194 44
Prevalence of ISO 14000 −8.027 0.10 0.034 45
Economic and Legal Context Index −11.738 0.19 0.002 45
Administrative Infrastructure Quality Index −12.815 0.23 0.001 45
Civil Liberties −12.206 0.47 0.000 45
Public Sector Competence −3.364 0.01 0.553 45
Gov’t Favor Private Sector Firms −10.056 0.15 0.008 45
Property Rights −9.644 0.27 0.000 45
Independent Judiciary −7.166 0.18 0.003 45
Irregular Payments −12.413 0.26 0.000 45
Legal Framework −9.343 0.23 0.001 45
Regulatory Burden −9.259 0.10 0.032 45
Level of Administrative Corruption −12.877 0.27 0.000 45
Honoring of Policies through Gov. Transition −8.685 0.11 0.021 45
Scientiﬁc and Research Infrastructure Index −10.010 0.14 0.009 45
Scientists and Engineers −0.006 0.09 0.038 45
Technology Position −7.931 0.18 0.003 45
Institutions −8.883 0.11 0.025 45
Licensing of Foreign Technology −11.980 0.08 0.049 45
Company R & D Spending −7.802 0.12 0.020 45
Willingness to Absorb New Technology −15.067 0.20 0.002 45
Importance of Innovation to Revenue −15.770 0.13 0.011 45
Gov’t Purchase Decisions for Tech. Products −9.316 0.06 0.109 45
Note: ∗ Refer to appendix A for deﬁnitions of variables.
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Among the variables in the economic and legal context grouping, all but
one (public sector competence) emergewith high statistical signiﬁcance and
the expected negative sign in the SO2 regressions. Some of the measures
account for a reasonable degree of explained variance (e.g., civil liberties,
property rights, and irregular payments). In general, the administrative
infrastructure variables show greater signiﬁcance and higher degrees of
explained variance than the scientiﬁc and technical capacity measures.
The administrative infrastructure sub-index is highly signiﬁcant, with a
reasonable degree of explained variance. The technical capacity sub-index
shows a high degree of signiﬁcance, but does not account for an especially
large amount of explained variance. The overall ELCI is signiﬁcant and
explains a reasonable amount of the variance in SO2 concentrations.
Ranking environmental regulatory quality
The bilateral, sub-index, and index regressions establish a statistically
signiﬁcant relationship between the various policy measures and
environmental performance. In the next stage of analysis,weuse theERRI to
explore thedifferences across countries in environmental regulatory quality.
Table 8 presents countries ranked by absolute ERRI scores. This index
(combining the regulatory stringency, structure, subsidies, and enforcement
sub-indices)14 represents a summary performancemeasure of the quality of
the environmental regulatory system in a country. Among the top-ranked
countries are Finland, Sweden, and Singapore. Countries at the bottom
include Guatemala, Ecuador, and Paraguay.
Given the signiﬁcant relationship between income levels and
environmental performance, we would expect a similar relationship
between income and environmental regulatory quality. What is most
interesting in table 8, then, is not so much the fact that Finland outranks
Paraguay on regulatory stringency, but the reasons why countries with
similar incomes perform so differently. For instance, why does Costa Rica
(36th place) do better than Peru (50th place)? And why does Poland (29th)
come out way ahead of Russia (57th)?
To control for income differences and hence the level of economic
development, table 9 ranks countries by their residuals from the regression
of ERRI and GDP per capita (plotted in ﬁgure 6). This relative ranking
represents a measure of environmental regulatory quality relative to
expectations established by income level. Among the low-income countries,
Jordan and Jamaica come out on top, while Ecuador and Paraguay trail.
Among middle-income countries, Singapore, Estonia, and New Zealand
rank high; Israel, Argentina, and Greece lag. Among the wealthiest nations,
Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands lead, while Italy, Norway, and
Ireland rank low. The United States occupies the bottom rung of the high-
income group ladder.
As noted earlier, ERRI and ELCI are highly correlated. Nevertheless,
it is evident that some countries have an economic and legal context
that outpaces their environmental regulatory quality, while others have
14 These sub-indices emerged as signiﬁcant in the analyses of all three dependent
variables.
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Table 8. Environmental regulatory regime index by country, absolute ranking
Rank Country Score Rank Country Score
1 Finland 2.303 37 Korea −0.121
2 Sweden 1.772 38 Malaysia −0.127
3 Singapore 1.771 39 Lithuania −0.146
4 Netherlands 1.747 40 Slovak Republic −0.177
5 Austria 1.641 41 Egypt −0.224
6 Switzerland 1.631 42 Panama −0.242
7 Germany 1.522 43 Mauritius −0.290
8 France 1.464 44 China −0.348
9 Denmark 1.384 45 Thailand −0.389
10 Iceland 1.354 46 Colombia −0.416
11 New Zealand 1.299 47 Bulgaria −0.584
12 Canada 1.297 48 Mexico −0.602
13 United Kingdom 1.185 49 Greece −0.619
14 United States 1.184 50 Peru −0.722
15 Belgium 1.159 51 Argentina −0.732
16 Australia 1.083 52 Zimbabwe −0.732
17 Japan 1.057 53 Bolivia −0.743
18 Norway 1.045 54 Indonesia −0.758
19 Ireland 0.546 55 India −0.759
20 Italy 0.498 56 Vietnam −0.770
21 Spain 0.437 57 Russia −0.895
22 Estonia 0.296 58 Sri Lanka −0.936
23 Hungary 0.283 59 Philippines −1.014
24 Slovenia 0.209 60 Dominican Republic −1.014
25 Chile 0.177 61 Venezuela −1.079
26 Czech Republic 0.073 62 Nicaragua −1.164
27 Uruguay 0.059 63 El Salvador −1.215
28 Israel 0.021 64 Romania −1.268
29 Poland 0.005 65 Ukraine −1.297
30 Jordan 0.002 66 Honduras −1.300
31 Portugal −0.028 67 Nigeria −1.314
32 South Africa −0.029 68 Bangladesh −1.331
33 Latvia −0.036 69 Guatemala −1.532
34 Jamaica −0.037 70 Ecuador −1.616
35 Brazil −0.077 71 Paraguay −1.743
36 Costa Rica −0.078
advanced environmental regulation faster than their economic and legal
development. In Israel, India, Ireland, the United States, South Africa,
the Philippines, and Nigeria, environmental regulation lags behind the
economic and legal context. In Finland, Austria, New Zealand, Panama,
and Bolivia, environmental regulatory quality appears to be ahead of
improvements in the broader economic and legal structure. The divergence
between ERRI and ELCI, however, was not statistically associated with
differences in environmental outcomes. This may be due to the high










Table 9. Environmental regulatory regime index relative to expected results given GDP per capita, listed by income groups
Low income countries (≤$6,500) Middle income countries ($6,500–23,000) High income countries (≥$23,000)
Rank Country Residual Rank Country Residual Rank Country Residual
1 Jordan 0.794 1 Singapore 0.806 1 Finland 1.165
2 Jamaica 0.793 2 Estonia 0.614 2 Sweden 0.725
3 Egypt 0.612 3 New Zealand 0.612 3 Netherlands 0.541
4 China 0.455 4 Latvia 0.499 4 France 0.404
5 Panama 0.355 5 Chile 0.494 5 Germany 0.377
6 Vietnam 0.216 6 Brazil 0.407 6 Austria 0.368
7 Colombia 0.204 7 Uruguay 0.402 7 United Kingdom 0.202
8 Bolivia 0.204 8 Lithuania 0.374 8 Switzerland 0.154
9 India 0.188 9 Poland 0.343 9 Denmark 0.037
10 Zimbabwe 0.187 10 Hungary 0.308 10 Canada −0.112
11 Thailand 0.180 11 South Africa 0.288 11 Australia −0.138
12 Indonesia 0.132 12 Costa Rica 0.235 12 Japan −0.168
13 Bulgaria 0.078 13 Malaysia 0.214 13 Belgium −0.173
14 Peru 0.002 14 Mauritius −0.003 14 Iceland −0.184
15 Sri Lanka −0.092 15 Czech Republic −0.031 15 Italy −0.495
16 Philippines −0.211 16 Slovak Republic −0.032 16 Norway −0.523
17 Nicaragua −0.217 17 Spain −0.175 17 Ireland −0.623
18 Nigeria −0.225 18 Slovenia −0.211 18 United States −0.792
19 Bangladesh −0.307 19 Mexico −0.259
20 Honduras −0.359 20 Portugal −0.426
21 Dominican Republic −0.397 21 Russia −0.487
22 Venezuela −0.436 22 Korea −0.558
23 El Salvador −0.461 23 Israel −0.626
24 Ukraine −0.470 24 Argentina −0.705
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Note: Both linear and uadratic model are tested.  The coefficient of the quadratic term is insignificant, hence the linear model is applied. q
Figure 6. Relationship between the environmental regulatory regime index and GDP per capita
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The relationship between environmental performance
and competitiveness
Finally, we turn to the question of whether environmental regulatory
stringency detracts from or contributes to economic progress. Figure 7
shows that the quality of a nation’s environmental regulatory regime is
strongly and positively correlated with its competitiveness as measured
by the World Economic Forum’s Current Competitiveness Index (CCI).15
Many of the nationswith top-tier competitiveness rankings also have strong
environmental performance scores. Finland, for example, ranks at the top
of the ERRI and at the top of the CCI. The United States stands out as
an exception with a high CCI rank and a relatively low environmental
regulation score.
The correlation revealed in ﬁgure 7 does not, of course, prove causation.
But the ﬁnding that a strong environmental regulatory regime need not
preclude top-tier economic performance is itself interesting. The fact
that the top environmental performers do not appear to have suffered
economically strongly supports the ‘soft’ version of the ‘Porter hypothesis’,
which argues that environmental progress can be achieved without
sacriﬁcing competitiveness (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995).
Whether the ‘hard’ version of this hypothesis – that countries with
aggressive environmental policies and programswill actually enhance their
competitiveness – requires time series data that are not yet available.
Figure 6 highlights the development policy choice that every nation
faces. Countries would like to move from the lower left corner of the chart,
which represents low levels of environmental performance and lownational
income, to the upper right quadrant, which represents high levels of both
environmental performance and income. The question is which path to
take. Or, to put it differently, must the environment be sacriﬁced to achieve
economic progress? Those countries above the regression line can be seen
as having chosen a ‘clean’ development trajectory in which environmental
regulatory quality advances ahead of economic progress. Those below the
line have chosen a relatively ‘dirty’ path to growth, with relatively lax
environmental regulation, in the hope of growing faster.
In addressing this choice, we are able to provide a crude test using the
available data. We regress a number of control variables on GDP per capita
growth between 1995 and 2000, including the initial level of GDPper capita,
gross ﬁxed capita formation as a percentage of GDP, and government
spending as a percentage of GDP. We then introduce a variable which
measures the residual from the regression of ERRI on GDP per capita
(table 10). Countries with positive residuals have an ERRI score that is
higher than would be expected given their income. Those with negative
15 The CCI (GCR, 2001) explores the microeconomic bases of a nation’s GDP per
capita. It is constructed from measures of competitiveness, based primarily on
survey data drawn from senior business leaders and government ofﬁcials. There
are two groups of measures, one measuring the sophistication of company
operations and strategy and the other addressing the quality of the business
environment. A single composite index was created by combining the two groups










































































































































Table 10. Environmental regulatory stringency and economic growth
Model 1 dependent variable: annual Model 2 dependent variable: annual
percentage growth rate of GDP percentage growth rate of GDP
per capita, 1995–2000 per capita, 1995–2000
Parameter Parameter
Variable estimate t Value Prob > |t| estimate t Value Prob > |t|
Intercept 1.577 3.62 0.001 −2.352 −1.91 0.060
GDP per Capita, 1995 (thousand, ppp) 0.056 1.77 0.082 0.092 2.78 0.007
General Government Spending, 2000 −0.043 1.62 0.111
Gross Fixed Investment (as % of GDP) 0.226 5.17 <.0001
Environmental Regulatory Regime Index Relative 0.830 1.51 0.135 0.795 1.66 0.102
to Expected Given GDP per Capita
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residuals have a lower ERRI position than would be forecast by the
country’s income level. This variable has a positive signwith signiﬁcance at
virtually the 90 per cent level. Countries that pursue a stringent regulatory
regime thus appear to achieve more rapid growth. While tentative, this res-
ult suggests thepossible superiority of the ‘cleandevelopment’model.More
years of data and better controls will be necessary to validate this ﬁnding.
Conclusion
The results presented here must be seen as preliminary. The data available
suffer from many limitations, narrowing the feasible statistical approaches.
Precise causal linkages remain unproven. Indeed, a central conclusion of
our research is that better environmental data are required at the global,
national, local, and corporate levels if a more empirical and systematic
approach to environmental improvement is to be implemented.
With these caveats, however, the relationships that do emerge as
statistically signiﬁcant are striking. The analysis provides considerable
evidence that cross-country differences in environmental performance
are associated, in part, with the quality of the environmental regulatory
regime in place. We ﬁnd that the rigor and structure of environmental
regulations have particular impact, as does emphasis on enforcement.
The damaging effect of subsidies is also clear. While developing a strong
and sophisticated regulatory regime that fully internalizes externalities
presents real challenges, ending price-distorting, inefﬁciency-creating,
and pollution-inducing subsidies is within the policy grasp of every
nation. Environmental performance appears to improve with certain
kinds of information, and to the extent that a nation’s environmental
regime is reinforced by an environmentally oriented private sector,
strong relationships with international environmental bodies also seem
to help. Information and institutions seem to have a limited impact on
environmental performance based on our analysis. This ﬁnding may, in
part, be due to weaknesses in the available data.
Our results also suggest that environmental performance requires
improvements in a country’s broader institutions. In practice, a nation’s
economic and legal context and its environmental regulatory regime appear
to go hand in hand. This association demands further exploration. But the
preliminary evidence developed here suggests that countries would beneﬁt
environmentally from an emphasis on developing the rule of law, eliminating
corruption, and strengthening their governance structures.
The strong association between income and environmental performance
also carries important implications. Among other things, it provides
powerful corroboration for a policy emphasis on poverty alleviation and
the promotion of economic growth as a key mechanism for improving
environmental results.
The country rankings that emerge from our analysis largely square with
observed reality. The variations in performance highlight the fact that
countries rangewidely in their policy choices and environmental outcomes,
even after controlling for level of income. There are clearly better andworse
ways to approach pollution control and natural resource management. The
data provided here offer some important clues as to where the search for
the best practices should begin.
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Fundamentally, our ﬁndings suggest that the environment need not be
sacriﬁced on the road to economic progress. Quite to the contrary, the
countries that have the most aggressive environmental policy regimes also
seem to be the most competitive and economically successful. Moreover,
we ﬁnd preliminary evidence that countries that adopt a stringent
environmental regime relative to their income may speed up economic
growth rather than retard it.
Our efforts to use statistical methods to explain environmental
successes and failures seem to conﬁrm some aspects of the prevailing
wisdom. Poverty appears to be signiﬁcantly correlated with environmental
degradation and thus deserves ongoing policy attention. Subsidies not
only skew prices and distort trade, but they appear to lead to inefﬁcient
production processes and unnecessary pollution as well.
Some new priorities also emerge from this research. Signiﬁcant
environmental gains look to be achievable simplybymoving environmental
laggards toward thepolicy approaches of those at the topof theperformance
ladder. Much greater strategic emphasis might therefore be placed on
identifying the best-policy practices and disseminating this information.
Likewise, the signiﬁcance of economic and legal context to environmental
results argues for a new focus on governance as the foundation for both
environmental and economic progress.
From an over-arching perspective, this study highlights the fact
that decision makers in the environmental domain need not rely on
guesswork. A more empirically grounded and analytically rigorous
approach to pollution control and natural resourcemanagement is possible.
Our analysis strongly supports the notion that the uncertainties that
plague environmental policy making can be reduced. We believe that a
robust, statistically serious, and data-driven approach to understanding
environmental problems and evaluating policy options could move the
environmental ﬁeld toward decision making based on objective evidence
rather than letting strongly held beliefs and emotions create divides that
are hard to bridge.
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Appendix A: Description of variables
Source
Variable Deﬁnition Measurement (WEF/ESI)
Environmental Performance
Energy use Energy Usage 1997 (High=More Total energy consumption per unit ESI
Inefﬁcient) of country GDP
Urban SO2 Urban SO2 concentration, 1990–96 Average normalized mean of total ESI
(High = More Particulates) SO2 per unit of city population
Urban particulates Urban particulates concentration, 1990–96 Average normalized mean of total ESI




Air regulation Stringency of air regulations Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
(High = More Stringent)
Water regulation Stringency of water regulations Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
(High = More Stringent)
Toxic waste regulation Stringency of toxic waste regulations Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
(High = More Stringent)
Chemical regulation Stringency of manufacturing chemical use Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
regulations (High = More Stringent)
Overall regulation Stringency of overall environmental Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
regulation (High = More Stringent
Regulatory structure
Flexibility Options for achieving compliance Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
in environmental regulations










Stability Environmental regulations in your country Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
are confusing and frequently
changing (High = Stable)
Early or late Environmental regulations are enacted Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
ahead or much later than other
countries (High = Ahead)
Compliance Hurts or Complying with environmental standards Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
Helps Competitiveness hurts/helps competitiveness (High = helps)
Regulation Adversarial or Environmental gains are achieved through Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
Cooperative adversarial means or government-business
cooperation (High = Cooperative)
Information
ESI Variables-% Percentage of ESI variables in publicly % of total ESI variables ESI
available data sets (n = 64)
Sustainable development info Availability of sustainable development ESI
information at the national level
Number of Sectoral EIA Number of sectoral EIA Guidelines ESI
Guidelines
Number of Environmental Number of Environmental Strategies ESI
Strategies & Action Plans & Action Plans
Subsidies
Government subsidies Government subsidies in your country Survey data (scale 1-7) WEF
encourage inefﬁcient use of energy or
materials or there are no subsidies
(High = High Subsidies)
Regulatory enforcement
Enforcement Environmental regulations are not enforced Survey data (scale 1-7) WEF
or enforced erratically or are
enforced consistently and fairly













Variable Deﬁnition Measurement (WEF/ESI)
International agreements Compliance with international agreements Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
is a high priority in your country’s
government (High = Agree)
Environmental institutions
IUCN Number of IUCN membership organizations, (per million population) ESI
1998
Memberships Number of memberships in environmental frequency count ESI
intergovernmental organizations, 1998
Prevalence of ISO 14000 How many companies utilize environmental Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
management system such as ISO
14000 (High = Most)
Administrative infrastructure quality
Civil and Political Liberties Index ranging from 1 (Low levels of liberties) ESI
to 7 (High levels)
Public sector competence The competence of personnel in the public sector Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
is higher or lower than in the private sector
(High = Higher than Private Sector)
Favoritism Public sector ofﬁcials tend to favor well-connected Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
private ﬁrms and individuals (High = Disagree)
Property rights Property rights are unclear and unprotected by Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
law or are clearly delineated and protected by
law (High = Clearly Delineated and Protected)
Independent judiciary The judiciary in your country is independent and Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
not subject to interference by the government










Irregular payments Irregular payments connected with import-export Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
permits, business licenses, exchange controls,
tax assessments, etc. (High = Never Occur)
Trusted legal framework A trusted legal framework exists in your country Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
for private business to challenge the legality
of government actions and/or regulations
(High = True)
Regulatory Burden Administrative regulations in your country are Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
burdensome/not burdensome (High = Not)
Level of Administrative Corruption Do other ﬁrms’ unfair or corrupt activities impose Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
costs on your ﬁrm (High = No Costs)
Honoring of Policies through Do new governments honor the contractual Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
Gov. Transition commitments and obligations of previous
regimes (High = Honor)
Scientiﬁc and research infrastructure
Scientists and engineers Research and development scientists and engineers (per million population) ESI
Technology position Country’s position in technology generally lags Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
behind most countries or is a leader (High = Leader)
Institutions Scientiﬁc research institutions in your country are not Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
internationally reputable (High = World Class)
Licensing foreign technology Licensing of foreign technology is uncommon Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
or is a common means to acquire new technology
(High = Common)
Intellectual property protection Intellectual property in your country is or is not Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF












Variable Deﬁnition Measurement Source (WEF/ESI)
Company R & D spending Companies in your country do or do not spend much on Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
R & D relative to international peers (High = Spend
Heavily on R & D)
Willingness to Absorb Companies in your country are not interested/aggressive Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
New Technology in absorbing new technology (High = Aggressive)
Importance of Innovation In your business, continuous innovation plays a major role Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
to Revenue in generating revenue not true/true (High = True)
Gov’t Purchase Decisions Government purchase decisions for technology products Survey data (scale 1–7) WEF
for Tech. Products are based solely on price/on technology and encourage
innovation (High = On Technology)
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Appendix B: Factor analysis results
First factor
First Difference % of
eigen from variance Score
value second EV explained coefﬁcient
Stringency Sub-Index 3.97 3.95 99.16
Air Regulation 0.251
Water Regulation 0.251
Toxic Waste Regulation 0.251
Chemical Regulation 0.251
Overall Regulation ∗
Regulatory Structure Sub-Index 4.05 3.60 81.08
Options for Compliance 0.216
Confusing and Changing 0.239
Early or Late 0.221
Compliance Hurts or Helps 0.224
Competitiveness
Regulation Adversarial or 0.210
Cooperative
Information Sub-Index 1.15 0.29 57.3138
ESI-Variables %-available 0.660
Sustainable Development Info 0.660
Number of Sectoral EIA ∗
Guidelines
Number of Environmental ∗
Strategies & Action Plans








Prevalence of ISO 14000 0.560
Administrative Infrastructure 5.35 5.14 89.09
Quality Index
Civil Liberties ∗
Public Sector Competence ∗






Level of Administrative 0.176
Corruption
Honoring of Policies through 0.175
Gov. Transition
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Appendix B: Continued
First factor
First Difference % of
eigen from variance Score
value second EV explained coefﬁcient
Scientiﬁc and Research 4.52 4.32 90.38
Infrastructure Index
Scientists and Engineers ∗
Technology Position 0.214
Institutions 0.212
Licensing of Foreign ∗
Technology
Company R & D Spending 0.212
Willingness to Absorb 0.210
New Technology
Importance of Innovation ∗
to Revenue
Gov’t Purchase Decisions for 0.203
Tech. Products
Rollup of Sub-Indices
Environmental Regulatory 3.46 3.06 86.56
Regime Index
Stringency Sub-Index 0.279








Scientiﬁc and Research 0.513
Infrastructure Index
Note: ∗ means that variable is not included in the corresponding index.
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